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PUTTING THE LAW BACK IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Suzanna Sherry*
Taking a cue from Professor Laurence Tribe's decision to
abandon the third edition of his constitutional law treatise,1 the
organizers of this symposium have asked us to address whether
constitutional law is in crisis. I am agnostic on that question, although I think that there has been a turn in the wrong direction.
But if there is a crisis, I know who to blame.
If constitutional law is in crisis, it is our fault. The legal
academy has erased the distinction between law and politics,
used its expertise for political advantage rather than for elucidation, and mis-educated a generation of lawyers. We thus should
not be surprised if judges have, as Professor Ristroph suggests,
lost their faith in the Constitution. We have led them into the
wilderness.
Law, especially constitutional law, and especially the hard
cases that reach the Supreme Court, is neither fully determinate
nor fully indeterminate. Legal decision making (including constitutional decision making) is, as I have argued elsewhere, conby2 institutional structure and
strained by precedent, by reason,
•
context, and by professional norms. Those constraints are not
perfect, nor do they eliminate discretion and disagreement. But
to the extent that they remain influential, the constraints curb
judicial excesses and ensure that constitutional doctrine remains,
by and large, governed by the rule of law rather than by the
whims of judges.
The first problem is that many legal academics have stopped
believing in the efficacy of those restraints, and consequently see
little distinction between politics and law. Following the lead of
* Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I thank Lisa
Bressman and Dan Farber for helpful comments.
1. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291 (2005).
2. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND
POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009).
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"attitudinalist" political scientists, hordes of law professors now
proclaim that constitutional law is nothing but politics, and
judges are merely legislators in black robes.' (Ironically, political
science scholarship is now moving away from attitudinalism 4 -as
usual, law professors are ten or twenty years behind the discipline from which they are borrowing ideas.)
For some of these legal academics, the appropriate response
is to attempt to reduce judicial discretion by imposing some
overarching methodology of constitutional interpretation. But
constitutional adjudication cannot be made mechanical, and all
of these "grand theories" end up leaving judges with essentially
as much discretion as they would have in the absence of the
theory In addition, even the few judges who purport to adhere
to one of these grand theories regularly depart from it. This attempt to eliminate discretion, then, is a dead end-although we
still can't seem to stop obsessing about it.
Other academics take the opposite approach. Instead of
taking politics out of constitutional law, they want to take constitutional law away from the courts. The latest fad in constitutional theory seems to be popular constitutionalism.6 Popular constitutionalists argue that because constitutional adjudication is

3.

The classic attitudinalist work in political science is JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
(1993); see
also Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995). For examples of endorsement by law professors, see
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL

MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND

THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (using the history of race-discrimination
cases to argue that judges inevitably reflect popular opinion); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006) (arguing that
courts reflect the views of popular majorities); Neal Devins, Better Lucky Than Good, 8
GREEN BAG 2D 33 (2004) (arguing that the most important factor in judicial decisions is
political events outside the control of the litigants); Barry Friedman, The Importance of
Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257,
1284 (2004) (stating that the idea of separating law from politics "may not even be coherent"). The idea that politics overshadows law in legal decision making is not new, but for
the past 70 years or so has been embraced by only by a handful of critical legal scholars.
Today it seems to permeate conventional constitutional thinking to an extent not seen
since the demise of the most extreme versions of Legal Realism.
4. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard
Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999).
5. For an elaboration of this critique, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002).
6. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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equivalent to legislative policy making, constitutional interpretation should be done only by the people or their representatives.
It is hard to know how popular constitutionalism would work,
since few (if any) of its advocates make any concrete suggestions
about how to implement popular constitutional interpretation.
But in any case, my view is that leaving constitutional decisions
to the majority carries an unacceptably high risk of majority tyranny. There is also the problem that many popular constitutionalists are fair-weather friends of populism: When the Supreme
Court is making decisions they agree with, they are perfectly
happy to leave constitutional interpretation to the courts.
The point, though, is not that both grand theory and popular constitutionalism are seriously flawed. The point is that their
adherents share a cynical view of constitutional law: that it is not
law, but politics. And the problem is that if even legal academics
take that view, the conflation of law and politics is bound to infect politicians, judges, and the American public. If everyone
stops believing in the rule of law, we will have a crisis. Perhaps
some of the doctrinal inconsistencies noted in this symposium
are the leading edge of the crisis, but if so, it is because judges
have begun to believe what academics have been telling them
about the judicial role.
The flip side of the focus on grand theory and popular constitutionalism, of course, is a decline in doctrinal scholarship.
Once the mainstay of legal scholarship, it is currently in disrepute. But if legal academics are not carefully examining constitutional doctrine -including how it plays out in the lower courtsthen it is no wonder that we think the doctrine is in shambles. To
the extent that constitutional adjudication is akin to common law
adjudication,7 we cannot expect constitutional doctrine to be
immediately and transparently coherent. It should be our task as
academics to create coherence out of the mass of cases, and to
uncover and rectify judicial lapses.8 Again, however, if legal
scholars believe that constitutional adjudication is more about
politics than about law, they will be unable even to envision sophisticated doctrinal scholarship.
Legal academics compound the problem-the second of my
three accusations-by practicing what they preach. Law profes-

7. For support for this proposition, see, for example, David A. Strauss, Common
Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A.
Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 210-11 (2008).
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sors as a group have multiple opportunities to enhance the rule
of law. The media and the public often rely on law professors to
clarify and explain constitutional decisions, and legal academics
also draft amicus briefs. But lately we have been squandering
those opportunities by using them to advocate particular political viewpoints rather than to educate or elucidate.
Law professors publicly criticize judicial opinions as "activist" or "political" rather than critiquing them on the merits. A
widely-distributed e-mail solicited law professors to signpurportedly as experts-a letter interpreting an obscure clause
of the Constitution, several even more obscure federal statutes,
and "the laws of Florida," based solely on expertise acquired
through "teaching and writing about the Constitution" generally. 9 Legal academics become "experts" quoted by the media
through sound-bites and political punditry rather than through
actual knowledge or thoughtful analysis. If constitutional law is
just politics in disguise, then all this makes sense. But again, the
more that legal academics manipulate law for political purposes,
the more they encourage judges to do so.
The third problem is that to the extent that we persuade our
students that constitutional doctrine is political and therefore
unprincipled, they will act on that belief as future lawyers,
judges, elected officials, and citizens. This problem goes much
deeper than simply teaching the legal realist or critical legal studies notion (now gradually taking over mainstream constitutional law) that the rule of law is really just the political preferences
of the judges. The problem is built into the law school curriculum itself. By attempting to teach constitutional law in the first
year, as so many law schools now do, we almost guarantee that
students will be drawn to the cynical view.
Why? Because the vast majority of law students arrive at
law school as either legal formalists or legal realists. Some of
them think law is completely determinate, and some think it is
completely indeterminate. They see the law as a matter of all
correct answers or none. And if they are dissuaded from their initial approach, their first reaction is usually to jump to the opposite pole. If law is not completely determinate, it must be completely indeterminate (and vice versa). New students in any

9. See Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School. Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual Capitalfrom the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13, 47-48
(2001).
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discipline are intellectually immature, and for that reason are
likely to see black and white instead of shades of gray.
It takes a while-usually more than just one semester-for
law students to become comfortable with the middle ground between determinacy and indeterminacy, and to create for themselves a framework that accommodates both judicial discretion
and the rule of law. It is easier for them to do this in courses that
are neither as politically salient nor as politically controversial as
constitutional law. If they see, for example, that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are neither linguistically determinate
nor infinitely malleable, they can begin to grasp the inherent
function of judges as principled interpreters of law.
Constitutional doctrine is the most intellectually difficult
subject to fit into this middle ground. (As I suggested earlier,
even many legal academics maintain that it does not fit.) If we
throw constitutional law at students before they have constructed a nuanced framework, they will instead have to choose
between formalism and realism. Since it is virtually impossible
for even neophytes to read Supreme Court opinions and conclude that constitutional law is determinate, they conclude that it
is completely indeterminate-in other words, that only the
judge's politics matter. We create another generation of lawyers
who will question the existence of the rule of law and lament the
crisis in constitutional doctrine.
So I close with three suggestions: (1) Remove constitutional
law from the first-year curriculum; (2) Take seriously the task of
educating the public, the media, and the courts, and (3) Stop
writing about constitutional theory and the perils of judicial review and start focusing on constitutional law.
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